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Monday, March 13, 2017

About philosophers and illogical men

Xkcd.com: Philosophy
Xkcd.com: Philosophy

Just recently, I’ve been reading a beautiful book written by Charles Petzold titled Code: I’m still at chapter eleven “Gates (not Bill)”, but just the chapter before, namely “Logic and Switches” had an intriguing problem described:

(1) All philosophers are logical; and (2) an illogical man is always obstinate (stubborn).

Well, these are two premises, but what would the conclusion be? According to Charles it is:

(3) Some obstinate people are not philosophers.

This is quite counter-intuitive, isn’t it? Well, I wanted see the proof! So I sat down, and translated all statements into predicate logic. Well, the first premise goes like this:

pP:logical(p)

You can read the above statement (1) like this: “For all p in P it holds that p is logical”, where p stands for a single philosopher and P stands for the set of all philosophers. This means we can read the whole thing more naturally like this: “For each philosopher, it holds that he (or she) is logical”, or shorter: “All philosophers are logical.”

Now, let’s have a look at the second premise:

mM:¬logical(m)obstinate(m)

So, let’s read it again: For all m in M it holds, that if m is illogical, then m is obstinate, simply meaning that “all illogical men are always obstinate.” Now, let’s translate the conclusion:

¬mM:obstinate(m)mP

which means that “not for all m among all men M, it holds that m is obstinate and m does not belong to the set of philosophers P”. This rather very complicated statement can be simplified to: “Some obstinate men are not philosophers!”

Good, now that we have translated perfectly understandable English into completely incomprehensible predicate logic, let’s do some magic to derive from the premises (1) and (2) the conclusion (3). But before that we need to state another rather obvious fact, namely that “all philosophers are men, but not all men are philosophers:”

PM

Above, we say that the set of philosophers P is a subset of all men M, which is the same as declaring that all philosophers are men (but not necessarily the other way around).

Derivation of the conclusion

Based on the premises () that all philosophers are men, and (1) that they are logical, we can deduce that there are some men who are not philosophers, hence illogical (where we assume based on (1) that only philosophers can be logical):

mM:mP¬logical(m)

Further, since all illogical men tend to be obstinate, we can derive that there exists also an illogical one, who is indeed obstinate:

mM:¬logical(m)obstinate(m)

which we can reformulate by using the fact, that “¬a implying b” (¬ab) is equivalent to “a or b” (ab):

mM:logical(m)obstinate(m)

Hence apparently, there is a man who is logical or obstinate! Now, if we combine (4) and (6) we get:

mM:¬logical(m)(logical(m)obstinate(m))

which is equal to — derived by pulling the left hand side into the parentheses and then simplifying ¬logical(m)logical(m) to , namely false:

mM:(¬logical(m)obstinate(m))

which is equal to — derived by dropping in the or statement:

mM:¬logical(m)obstinate(m)

which is equal to — according to (1):

mM:obstinate(m)mP

So (10) means that “some obstinate man are not philosophers!” Quod erat demonstrandum.

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